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Abstract
Contemporary peacekeeping operations carry outmanydisparate tasks,whichhas trig-
gered a debate about “Christmas Tree mandates.” Did the UN Secretariat or the UN
Security Council drive this expansion? Using original data on nineteen UN peacekeep-
ing missions, 1998–2014, this article compares peacekeeping tasks recommended by
the Secretariat to thosemandated by theCouncil. It finds that the twobodies expressed
different preferences regarding the nature, number, and novelty of peacekeeping tasks.
First, the Council dropped Secretariat-recommended tasks as often as it added new
ones on its own initiative. Second, the two bodies disagreed more over peacebuild-
ing and peacemaking tasks than over peacekeeping tasks. Third, the Council preferred
to be the one to introduce novel tasks that had not appeared in previous mandates.
Finally, among the countries that “held the pen” on peacekeeping resolutions, the
United States was themost prone to dropping Secretariat-proposed tasks and the least
willing to add tasks itself.
Keywords
international organization – United Nations – peacekeeping – peacebuilding –
Security Council – Secretariat – international bureaucracy – penholder
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1 Introduction1
In the past three decades, UN peacekeeping operations have grown in size and
complexity. The UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, a quintessential Cold War
mission, had two main tasks: to prevent the resumption of hostilities and to
contribute to the restoration of law and order. Its mandate was outlined in one
paragraph of a Security Council resolution. One recent peacekeeping opera-
tion, the UN Mission in the Central African Republic, has to protect civilians,
coordinate electoral assistance, support the extension of state authority, mon-
itor human rights, assist with security sector reform, and support mediation
and reconciliation at national and local levels. Its mandate is fourteen pages
long. The expansion of peacekeeping activities has given rise to a new pejora-
tive term in theUN jargon—“ChristmasTreemandates”—referring tomissions
that are overburdened with tasks that reflect the agendas of multiple actors
involved in the mandate negotiations.
The evolution of peacekeeping mandates is affected by the relations be-
tween two of the UN’s principal organs, the Security Council and the Secre-
tariat.The Secretariat provides reports that recommend thedurationand scope
of mandates, which serve as an informal basis for Security Council negotia-
tions on resolutions that specify mandates. In the literature on peacekeeping,
there are conflicting accounts of what the Secretariat and the Council want to
see in peacekeeping mandates: both bodies have sometimes been portrayed
as conservative and sometimes innovative. In this article, we assess these rival
expectations, presenting the first systematic study (to our knowledge) of pref-
erences expressedby the Secretariat and theCouncil.Howdo thesepreferences
over peacekeeping mandates differ between the Secretariat and the Security
Council? How are these differences distributed?
We used independently collected, task-level data to map and compare the
recommended and adopted mandates of nineteen peacekeeping missions
launched between 1998 and 2014.2 Based on descriptive statistics—the count
1 The authors would like to thank two anonymous reviewers, Global Governance editors, Vin-
cenzo Bove, Theresa Squatrito, and Jonas Tallberg for constructive and useful comments, as
well as the organizers and participants of the workshop “Explaining Authority in Interna-
tionalOrganizations” atMaastrichtUniversity in Brussels (2014) and the section “21st Century
International Bureaucracy: People, Power, and Performance” at the European Consortium for
Political Research General Conference in Oslo (2017), where previous versions of this article
were presented. All errors are the authors’ own. The authors are listed in reverse alphabetical
order and equal authorship applies.
2 UNMission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA), UNMission in the Central African
Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission
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andcategorizationof tasksproposed in Secretariat’s reports andSecurityCoun-
cil resolutions authorizing peacekeeping missions—we observed five key pat-
terns. First, although 89 percent of all tasks proposed by the Secretariat sur-
vived into Council resolutions, the two bodies repeatedly diverged with regard
to their preferred mandates. Second, the Council was equally likely to intro-
duce a task not proposed by the Secretariat as to reject a Secretariat-proposed
task, which casts doubt over the perception that the Council is invariably
opposed to peacekeeping expansion. Third, the Council was more likely to
reject Secretariat-proposed tasks if they had not appeared in previous man-
dates, suggesting a desire tomaintain the initiative. Fourth, the Secretariat and
the Council disagreed more often over peacemaking and peacebuilding tasks
than over peacekeeping tasks. Since peacemaking is a politically delicate activ-
ity and peacebuilding is a costly one, the divergencemay betray the two bodies’
varying sensitivity to risks and costs. Fifth, among the two permanent Council
members that drafted the majority of peacekeeping resolutions in our sam-
ple, the United States was more cautious about peacekeeping expansion than
France,which is in linewithbehavior expected from theUnited States in peace-
keeping negotiations.
The article has four parts. First, we review existing accounts of the Secre-
tariat’s and the Security Council’s behavior, drawing on general international
organization (IO) scholarship and specialized peacekeeping literature. Sec-
ond, we introduce the Secretariat’s and the Council’s roles in peacekeeping
mandate negotiations and outline our expectations about their preferences.
Third, we describe the construction of our task-level dataset of mandate pref-
erences, present general patterns, and discuss what the data unveil about the
Secretariat’s and theCouncil’s preferences.We conclude by outlining the impli-
cations of our findings for the understanding of IO behavior and suggesting
directions for further research.
in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), UNMultidimensional Integrated Stabilization
Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), UN Orga-
nization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), UN Organization
StabilizationMission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), UNOperation
in Burundi (ONUB), UN-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), UN Mis-
sion in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), UNMission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), UNMission
in Liberia (UNMIL), UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), UN Mission of Support in East Timor
(UNMISET), UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
(UNMIT), UN Operation in Côte d’ Ivoire (UNOCI), UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
(UNOMSIL), and UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).
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2 The Secretariat, the Security Council, and the Evolution
of Peacekeeping
The UN Secretariat, like other international bureaucracies, has both institu-
tional and policy interests.3 In terms of institutional interests, principal-agent
models expect secretariats to prefer expansive task sets, which can motivate
larger budgets and new posts.4 In the popular imagination, “UN bureaucrats
are seen as profligate globalists who spend first, budget second, and simply
pass along the costs tomember states.”5With regard to peacekeeping, theHigh-
Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) argued that “compre-
hensive reports of the Secretary-General … drive large mandates with often
formulaic mandate tasks.”6
Yet secretariats also have policy interests. They want their organization
to succeed for self-serving and (due to self-selection or professional social-
ization)7 ideational reasons. International bureaucrats pursue personal and
organizational gains.8 Member states often find it desirable for secretariats to
develop preferences that are closer to the organization’s collective goal than
thepositions of national governments of theday. For example, thedelegationof
legislative initiative to the EuropeanCommission has been driven partly by the
aspiration to empower a pro-integrationist agenda setter.9 Similarly, the man-
agement of peacekeeping has been delegated to the UN Secretariat, which has
a keen interest, both self-serving and ideational, in the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security.10
The interaction of these underlying interests can lead to expansive or con-
servative preferences regarding new IO initiatives. Enlarging its portfolio of
responsibilities can enable an IO to address cooperation problemsmore effec-
tively. As examples of IOs that have ventured into climate change adaptation,
bioethics, or structural adjustment lending show, secretariats often push for
expansion into new areas.11 In UN peacekeeping, the Secretariat has played
an entrepreneurial role with regard to relatively uncontroversial multidimen-
3 Dijkstra 2016.
4 Pollack 2003.
5 Hawkins et al. 2006, 4.
6 UN 2015, 60.
7 Cortell and Peterson 2006; Gould 2006.
8 Ege 2020.
9 Pollack 2003.
10 Allen and Yuen 2014.
11 Sharma 2013; Hall 2016; Littoz-Monnet 2020.
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sional peacekeeping tasks such as public information and strategic communi-
cations,12 or those that help protect the UN’s reputation such as environmental
management.13
Alternatively, the desire to succeed can lead to an unwarranted attachment
to tried and testedmethods.Michael Barnett andMartha Finnemore argue that
the organizational culture of international secretariats is often conservative
and suspicious of rapid change and significant risk.14 Especially in the field of
conflict resolution, as Hylke Dijkstra notes, secretariats want “achievable man-
dates, as they will be first in line to be blamed for military failure” and, thus,
“will try to prevent overly ambitious objectives.”15 For example, during the 1994
Rwandan genocide, the UN Secretariat did not push for innovative solutions
to protect civilians, but remained “timid” and “indecisive,”16 leaving the advo-
cacy for such solutions tonon-governmental organizations andelectedCouncil
members.17
For their part, member states tend to seek to keep expansionary tenden-
cies of international secretariats in check and costs low.18 In UN peacekeep-
ing, states have traditionally been wary of delegating significant staff resources
and competencies to the Secretariat.19 At the same time, the Security Council,
has often been willing to expand the scope of peacekeeping. Member States
have championed the addition of new tasks to peacekeeping mandates, for
example, those related to the protection of civilians (Canada) or the so-called
women, peace, and security agenda (Namibia). The trend toward expansion
through activities such as electoral assistance or security sector reform has
been linked to the Western ambition to promote democracy and market lib-
eralization.20 Since the advent of stabilization missions, some claim that this
liberal project has been supplanted by using peacekeeping to advance coun-
terterrorism objectives.21
Some UN officials resent the tendency to expand peacekeeping toward
robust action against militias, urban gangs, and terrorist groups: for them,
12 Oksamytna 2018.
13 Maertens 2019.
14 Barnett and Finnemore 2004. See also Bauer et al. 2009; Kamradt-Scott 2010.
15 Dijkstra 2016, 38.
16 Barnett 2002, 3.
17 Oksamytna 2017.
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peacekeeping is “not the SWAT team … sent in to clean up the bad neigh-
bourhoods of the world.”22 While principal-agent models would expect secre-
tariats to welcome any kind of task expansion, a more sophisticated view of
their policy interests requires taking into account the nature of such expan-
sion.
Taken as a whole, these expectations boil down to two conflicting accounts
of the Secretariat’s and the Security Council’s preferences in peacekeeping.
According to the first view, the Secretariat, for self-serving or ideational rea-
sons, has sought the expansion of UN peacekeeping. According to the second
view, theCouncil has imposednew tasks on anunwilling Secretariat, which has
tried to resist unrealistic mandates. In the following section, we discuss what
information about their preferences is revealed by the positions that the two
bodies express in the process of negotiating peacekeeping mandates.
3 PeacekeepingMandate Negotiations
3.1 The Negotiation Process
Unless an exceptional situation requires immediate action, the Security Coun-
cil requests a report from the Secretariat before the establishment, adjust-
ment, or closure of a peacekeeping operation. Following such a request, the
Department of PeaceOperations (DPO)23 dispatches an assessmentmission to
the region and, based on what it learns, develops mandate recommendations.
The Secretary-General then transmits the DPO-prepared report to the Coun-
cil, where Member States produce the draft resolution. Most resolutions are
drafted by one of the three Western permanent members: France, the United
Kingdom, and the United States, referred to as the Permanent Three (P3). This
practice is called “penholding.” The P3 usually negotiate among themselves;
thenwithChina andRussia, the other twoof the five permanentmembers (P5);
and, finally, with the electedmembers.24 Penholders have a considerable influ-
ence on the drafting of peacekeeping resolutions.
As for the Secretariat’s recommendations, the Security Council is free to dis-
regard them. For example, in the planning for the mission in South Sudan,
the United States “essentially ignored the recommendations of the UN Secre-
22 Former Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Jean-Marie Guéhenno, as quoted in
Paddon Rhoads 2016, 103.
23 Before 2019, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).
24 Security Council Report 2013.
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tariat.”25 A senior US official noted, tellingly, that theUS government examined
“UN reports on peacekeeping, taking them for what they are: recommenda-
tions. And the eventual resolutions voted by the Security Council often dif-
fer significantly from UN Secretariat recommendations.”26 Yet informally, as
Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore argue, the Secretariat’s reports pro-
vide “parameters of the Council’s discussions, shaping which options are given
serious or slight consideration.”27 Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M. Malone,
and Bruno Stagno Ugarte also deem that these reports “play an important role
in shaping the Council’s decisions.”28 Manuel Fröhlich and Abiodun Williams
concur that the Secretariat is “able to preconfigure some of the options avail-
able to the Council through reporting.”29
These reports are not the only way in which the Secretariat influences the
direction of peacekeeping: other ways include the circulation of key individu-
als and shapingMember States’ policy through persuasion and advocacy.30 For
example, Ban Ki-moon’s reframing of cultural heritage protection as a security
issue has encouraged France and Italy to propose Security Council resolutions
on the matter.31 In this article, we focus on public reports and resolutions as a
source of aggregate data on the Secretariat’s and the Council’s expressed pref-
erences.
3.2 The Secretariat’s and the Security Council’s Expressed Preferences
We acknowledge that the Security Council can pressure the Secretariat behind
the scenes to make its recommendations align with the Council’s preferences
before a report’s release.32 The Secretariat can also tweak its recommendations
to make them palatable to Member States on its own initiative. In general,
international bureaucracies strive to foresee member states’ wishes and adjust
recommendations accordingly.33 This behavior is typical of many secretariats
that prepare drafts or options for member states’ consideration, such as the
European Commission,34 although international bureaucracies differ in their
25 Dijkstra 2015, 37.
26 Senior US official, as quoted in Dijkstra 2015, 35.
27 Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 153.
28 von Einsiedel, Malone, and Stagno Ugarte 2016, 835.
29 Fröhlich andWilliams 2018, 220.
30 Karlsrud 2016.
31 Foradori and Rosa 2017.
32 Peck 2016, 458.
33 Martin 1993; Pollack 1997, 2003; Gould 2006.
34 Tallberg 2002.
Downloaded from Brill.com06/15/2021 12:19:00PM
via free access
decorating the “christmas tree” 233
Global Governance 27 (2021) 226–250
inclination to anticipate member states’ “red lines,”35 and some may do so to
accommodate only specific countries like the US.36
Many studies note that the UN Secretariat takes the views of Member
States—especially the P5—into account when developing peacekeeping
options.37 Although the seminal Brahimi Report enjoined the Secretariat to
“tell the Security Council what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear,”38
HIPPO found it necessary to remind that the Secretariat should “be frank in
its assessments.”39 Therefore, the Secretariat’s reports might not always reflect
its sincere preferences. However, they do represent expressed preferences, or
views that the Secretariat is comfortable communicating publicly. This is an
improvement over “ignoring bureaucratic preferences all together or simply
assuming them ex ante,” which is typical in research on international secre-
tariats.40 Below, we outline what expressed preferences of the Secretariat—as
well as of the Security Council—tell us about their views on peacekeeping.
3.3 Similarity and Divergence in the Expressed Preferences
When the Secretariat’s recommendations on peacekeeping correspond to the
provisions of subsequent Security Council resolutions, it signals one of the fol-
lowing: consensus on the direction of peacekeeping; an anticipation of the
Council’s reactions; or persuasion of the Council by the Secretariat. Differ-
ences emerge when the Secretariat misjudges the Council’s preferences; fails
to convince the Council; or finds it necessary to declare an unpopular posi-
tion. Adjudicating between these scenarios is a challenging task, given the
general difficulties involved in measuring preferences. For example, prefer-
ences revealed to an interviewer can be subject to “justifications, embellish-
ments, lies, or selective memories.”41 Several alternative approaches are pos-
sible, each with its advantages and disadvantages. Here, we opt for looking at
the aggregate patterns of the expressed preferences on the assumption that,
if all discrepancies between peacekeeping reports and resolutions were the
result of the Secretariat’s inability to anticipate Council’s wishes, they would
have been distributed evenly across all types of tasks. In contrast, a nonran-
dom distribution would suggest that the Secretariat chooses to emphasize
35 Knill et al. 2019.
36 Clark and Dolan 2021.
37 Allen and Yuen 2014; Weinlich 2014; Fröhlich andWilliams 2018.
38 UN 2000, x.
39 UN 2015, 25.
40 Ege, Bauer, andWagner 2020, 562.
41 King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 112.
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certain tasks over others. In light of the current literature dominated by case
studies, a systematic overview of the divergences between the two bodies,
across all missions where such analysis is feasible, is an important step in
improving our understanding of institutional preferences in UN peacekeep-
ing.
Each report and resolution is context-specific, and tasks that are appro-
priate in one situation may be counterproductive elsewhere. This is another
reason for looking at peacekeeping mandates in the aggregate, which allows
examining general patterns of the Secretariat–Security Council divergences as
opposed to disagreements over a specific conflict that may be influenced by
geopolitics or public opinion. The host government also tries to shape peace-
keeping mandates,42 but it is reasonable to assume that it can lobby both the
Secretariat and the Council, thus affecting reports and resolutions in equal
measure.
In our analysis of the Secretariat’s and the Security Council’s expressed pref-
erences, we looked at several patterns of behavior by the two bodies that are
significant theoretically. First, we assessed whether the Council is more likely
to drop suggested tasks or add tasks on its own initiative. If the Council drops
many tasks or drops tasks without adding any, it signals the Secretariat’s pref-
erence for more expansive mandates than the Council can accept. Second, we
analyzed whether tasks over which the two bodies disagree are of a specific
nature, classifying them into the categories of peacekeeping, peacemaking, and
peacebuilding.Disagreements over oneof the categoriesmean that theCouncil
and the Secretariat do not have the same views on how prominent it should be
in contemporary multidimensional missions. Third, we investigated whether
the Council reacted differently to suggestions concerning new as opposed to
well-established tasks. If the Council tends to reject Secretariat-proposed tasks
that have not appeared in previous mandates, it indicates that the Council
seeks to maintain the initiative and shape peacekeeping’s evolution, rather
than allowing the Secretariat to play such a role. Fourth,we comparedpenhold-
ers in their propensity to follow the Secretariat’s recommendations. If penhold-
ers react differently to the Secretariat’s proposals, it suggests cleavages within
the Council.
42 Yuen 2020.
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4 Data
4.1 Sample andMethodology
To assess peacekeeping preference patterns, we created a dataset covering
nineteen peacekeeping missions established between 1998, the year when the
SecurityCouncil started to spell out allmandated tasks consistently,43 and 2014,
when the last peacekeeping mission was authorized at the time of this writ-
ing that met the criteria for inclusion in our sample.44 This sample excluded
political and civilian missions,45 peacebuilding offices, and small cease-fire or
border monitoring missions whose mandate is set out in a bilateral agreement
between the parties.46
For each of the missions, we gathered the full text of relevant Secretary-
General’s reports and Security Council resolutions from official electronic
archives. The Secretariat’s reports before the establishment of a new operation
consist of two parts: the first part provides relevant background information
and political analysis, while the second part offers recommendations regarding
the size and mandate of the mission, frequently in the form of a list of tasks.
Security Council resolutions have preambular paragraphs and operative para-
graphs. Our data emerged from a comparison of the tasks recommended in the
second part of the Secretariat’s reports with those stipulated in the operative
paragraphs of the corresponding Security Council resolution.47
Since the Secretariat and the Security Council donot produce a joint text but
two separate ones, the methods for studying formal agenda-setting processes,
such as in the European Union (EU) institutions,48 were not suitable in our
case. Similarly, methods of quantitative content analysis, which are useful for
43 During the UN’s early days, the Security Council delegated the responsibility for defin-
ing tasks and sizes of peacekeeping operations to the Secretariat. From 1998 onward, the
Council has specified all tasks explicitly in its resolutions.
44 The UNMission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH) authorized in 2017 is a rule of
law mission without a military component and, therefore, differs from other missions in
the sample.
45 Civilian presences such as the UNMission in Kosovo (UNMIK).
46 Small border monitoring missions such as the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei
(UNISFA).
47 Although mandates undergo substantial changes over the course of a mission, the Sec-
retariat’s reports recommending mandate alterations are not as specific about recom-
mended tasks as reports issued before a new mission. It is unclear whether a task that
the Secretariat does not mention before mandate extension is expected to be eliminated
from the resolution or continue unchanged. For this reason, our analysis is restricted to
initial mandates.
48 For example, Kreppel 1999; Kasak 2004.
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understandingwide patterns inUN resolutions, did not provide sufficient gran-
ularity in our case,49 since task categorization required us to capture subtleties
in the language and exposition of UN resolutions and reports.We followed the
practice of inductive category development in qualitative content analysis,50
recording tasks of one peacekeeping mission, checking whether those tasks
were present in the mandate of the next mission, and adding tasks that were
not on the list.
Three clarifications regarding the coding deserve mentioning. First, we
strived to attain a balance between wide and narrow task definitions. While
widely defined categories risk lumping together disparate tasks, more fine-
grained categories would have complicated cross-mission analysis and led to
under- or overestimation of the differences between the Secretariat and the
Council if the language was more or less precise but the intentions were the
same.
Second, delineating tasks in peacekeeping mandates involved unavoidable
generalizations. For example, the language on the protection of civilians varies
greatly across resolutions. Some missions, such as UN Mission in Sierra Leone
(UNAMSIL), received a cautious mandate to afford protection to civilians
under imminent threat of physical violence within the mission’s capabilities
and areas of deployment without prejudice to the responsibilities of the host
government. In contrast, the UN Organization Stabilization Operation in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (MONUSCO) received a much
stronger andmore specific mandate to “ensure the effective protection of civil-
ians,” mentioning specific categories in need of attention.51 However, in our
dataset, this task was recorded as “protecting civilians,” with two variations:
executive (the mission undertakes the task itself) and advisory (the mission
advises the host government on how to protect civilians).
Third, we excluded provisions regulating missions’ internal organization of
work, such as providing HIV testing to peacekeepers, promoting gender equal-
ity within its ranks, or developing specific strategies, since the Security Council
might not always find it necessary to mandate them explicitly.
Based on the task-level data, we carried out two further data operations. For
everymission since 1998,we assessedwhether the Security Council’s resolution
accepted tasks outlined in the Secretariat’s report, dropped tasks, or addednew
tasks not recommended by the Secretariat. The resulting variables enabled us
49 For example, Baturo, Dasandi, and Mikhaylov 2017.
50 Mayring 2004.
51 UN Security Council 2010, 4.
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to study patterns of change. We also categorized each task into larger groups,
based on type, novelty, and penholder, according to definitions specified in the
two following subsections.
4.2 Patterns in UN PeacekeepingMandates, 1998–2014
Figure 1 exhibits data across the nineteenmissions in our sample, outlining the
scope of peacekeeping mandates recommended by the Secretariat and subse-
quent modifications by the Security Council.52 Since 1998, the Secretariat has
recommended a total of 238 tasks be included in the mandates in our sample,
with an average of 13.1 tasks per mission. Around this average, we observed sig-
nificant variation over time. With a few exceptions, the general trend is one of
expansion: the scope and specificity of peacekeeping mandates, as measured
by the count of tasks, have increased over time. This increase was not linear.
After recommending mandates with around five to ten tasks during the 1990s
and early 2000s, with the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in 2003 the Secre-
tariat moved to suggesting more elaborate and extensive mandates, typically
including between twelve and twenty tasks.
Figure 2 also exhibits data on mandate changes, as expressed in the Secu-
rity Council’s acceptance or rejection of the Secretariat-recommended tasks.
Of the 238 recommended tasks, the Council adopted 212 (89 percent). Seven-
teen of nineteenmissions experienced some kind of modification. TheCouncil
rejected a total of twenty-six tasks (11 percent) and added twenty-four new
tasks (equivalent to 11 percent). The Council thus dropped recommended tasks
approximately as often as it added new ones.
Tasks varied in their probability of being modified by the Security Council.
A few tasks, including electoral support, were never modified, whereas oth-
ers were more contested. Support for early recovery is one example: of the
nine instances where it was proposed by the Secretariat, the Security Coun-
cil declined it four times, or in nearly half of the cases. Similarly, the Council
rejected suggested tasks related to justice sector reform (three out of ten times)
and natural resource management (two out of five times). The fact that the
Secretariat insisted on tasks that had previously been dropped by the Coun-
cil suggests that it expressed its preferences even when it could imagine they
would not be endorsed. Conversely, the Council added certain tasks to the list
suggested by the Secretariatmore often than others. Exampleswere the protec-
52 FigureA1 in theAppendix presents accepted, added, anddropped tasks across allmissions
in our sample.
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figure 1 Scope of peacekeeping mandates, 1998–2014; tasks suggested by the Secretariat and subse-
quent modifications by the Security Council; missions organized chronologically
tion of civilians (added twice) and of women (added twice), aswell as safety for
refugees and their return (also added twice). These tasks entail a possibility of
UN troops being called on to provide physical protection to (specific groups of)
civilians, which might require the use of force, and the protection of civilians
has been interpreted as necessitating robust operations against rebel groups in
some context such as in the DRC. This finding supports the view of the Council
as willing to expand peacekeeping in the direction of robust operations, while
the Secretariat cautions against using the Blue Helmets as “SWAT teams in bad
neighborhoods,” as discussed above.
Intriguingly, there were a few tasks on which the Security Council alter-
natedbetweendropping them for onemissionbut adding them for another. For
example, the task of assisting in the delivery of justice was removed from the
suggested list in one instance (UNMIL), but added for two other missions: the
UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central
AfricanRepublic (MINUSCA). Itmight reflect situation-specific analysis or the
growing acceptance of this task by the Council over time.
To examine variation across different types of tasks, we categorized tasks
into peacemaking, peacekeeping, or peacebuilding, relying on the UN defini-
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figure 2 Tasks specified in UN peacekeeping mandates, 1998–2014
tions of these core functions. Peacemaking seeks to address conflicts inprogress
and bring hostile parties to an agreement, for example, via good offices or
mediation; peacekeeping seeks to preserve peace and assist in implementing
agreements; and peacebuilding aims to improve structural conditions for long-
term peace (see Figure A1 for the categorization).53 Whereas peacebuilding
53 UN 1992.Whilemost tasks fit into one of these categories, some tasks—such as the exten-
sion of state authority—could be reasonably categorized as, for example, both peacekeep-
ing and peacebuilding. In these cases, we categorized tasks based on the dominant orien-
tation. We categorized a task as peacekeeping if the task does not aim to transform host
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represented 41 percent of all tasks in the 1990s, its share grew to 50 percent
in the 2000s and to 52 percent by the 2010s. Over the same period, the share
of peacekeeping tasks shrunk from 50 percent to 38 percent. This reflects the
reorientation of peacekeeping away from its conventional core and to multidi-
mensional, complex operations with wider mandates.
To summarize, we identified threemajor patterns in the descriptive data. To
begin with, our data clearly demonstrate the expansion of UN peacekeeping,
frommandates narrowly focused onpeacekeeping tomore extensivemandates
that incorporate a greater number of peacebuilding tasks. Next, the fact that
the Security Council adopted 89 percent of the tasks recommended by the
Secretariat demonstrates that significant portions of the task portfolios from
the Secretary-General’s reports survived into the adopted resolutions. Finally,
while there is considerable overlap between the two bodies, our data point to
islands of contestation and diverging preferences, further examined in the next
section.
4.3 The Nature of the Secretariat–Security Council Disagreements
We examined instances of overlap and divergence between the Secretariat’s
and the Security Council’s preferred task sets, focusing specifically on the
propensity of the Council to accept or drop tasks proposed by the Secretariat,
as well as add tasks of its own. With this focus, we examined variation across
three dimensions of theoretical interest: the type of task, the novelty of task,
and the penholder.
Turning first to the type, Figure 3 summarizes the proportion of tasks ac-
cepted, dropped, or added in each of the three categories of peacemaking,
peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. With regard to peacekeeping tasks, there
was less disagreement between the Secretariat and the Security Council. Only
6 percent of such tasks suggested by the Secretariat were dropped by the Coun-
cil, pointing to a considerable alignment regarding the nature of conventional
peacekeeping. Peacemaking tasks are the most likely to be adjusted by the
Council, with 14 percent of suggested tasks dropped and a further 14 percent
added. The combination of a low baseline (only twenty-two tasks in total) and
a high likelihood of revisions suggests that peacemaking is not seen as the key
element of UN peacekeeping and that the Secretariat and the Council view
it differently. This may reflect political dilemmas inherent to the good offices
country’s society or politics (the authority that is extended can still lack legitimacy or
inclusiveness), which makes it different from peacebuilding.
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figure 3 Accepted and amended tasks, by category
role.54 Peacemaking might require the UN to engage with host country elites
with questionable human rights records.55
The Security Council appears to be wary of peacebuilding tasks. In the
studied period, the Council was twice as likely (12 percent) to drop a sug-
gested peacebuilding task than a suggested peacekeeping task (6 percent).
Peacebuilding tasks were also the least likely to be added by the Council. The
Council’s greater caution about peacebuilding, as comparedwith conventional
peacekeeping, may reflect its hesitance to expand the UN’s remit, extend mis-
sion duration, and incur costs. Many peacebuilding tasks require the UN to
remain engaged for a considerable time in the host country. The Secretariat’s
tendency to recommend peacebuilding tasksmight be an expression of its pol-
icy interests (based on the belief that peacebuilding is the best way to support
sustainable peace) or institutional interests (based on the anticipation that
peacebuilding could translate into greater responsibilities and more funding),
or a combination of the two.
With regard to the novelty of a task, we analyzed howaproposed task’s inclu-
sion in a previous mandate affected its chances of approval. This allowed us to
determine whether or not precedent and “previously agreed language,” which
the Security Council is expected to value,56 facilitated tasks’ acceptance, aswell
as whether the Council was willing to cede the initiative to the Secretariat in
terms of orienting peacekeeping into new areas. Figure 4 summarizes our data,
disaggregating acceptance and modification across “old” tasks (those that had
appeared in previous mandates) and “new” tasks (those that had never before
appeared in a mandate). Of the twenty-six new tasks proposed by the Secre-
tariat, 77 percent (twenty) were accepted by the Council. Of the 192 old tasks
54 Engell and Jacobsen 2019.
55 von Billerbeck and Tansey 2019.
56 Gifkins 2016.
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figure 4 Accepted and amended tasks, by novelty
proposed, 92 percent (196)were accepted. In otherwords, the Council was con-
siderably less resistant to tasks that had been included in previous mandates.
However, when it came to adding new tasks on its own initiative, the Secu-
rity Council was not particularly restrictive. Of the twenty-four tasks added by
the Council, nearly a third (29 percent) were new tasks. Together, these data
suggest that the Council is not necessarily opposed to the expansion of peace-
keeping’s functions, but prefers to control the direction of its evolution.
Finally, we examined whether the acceptance of the Secretariat’s recom-
mendations depended on the Security Council member(s) that “held the pen,”
or led the negotiations, on a particular mission. Figure 5 illustrates the propor-
tion of accepted and modified tasks across different penholders. The United
States and France were the most active penholders, responsible for more than
two-thirds of all resolutions, so we grouped the rest of the penholders into
the “other” category. The data show that the United States and France were
considerably more likely to modify mandates suggested by the Secretariat as
compared with the other penholders. This might mean that smaller powers
and collective penholders invest more effort into prenegotiations with the Sec-
retariat, or that the Secretariat plays an important coordinating role in those
cases. We also note that the United States (which is responsible for 27.89 per-
cent of peacekeeping expenses) was more likely to drop suggested tasks than
France (which pays 5.61 percent). The United States was also less likely to add
tasks without the Secretariat’s prompting. While we cannot be entirely cer-
tain about how the negotiating dynamic within the Council unfolds in each
case, or how the United States’ preferences change across different adminis-
trations, these aggregate patterns suggest that the United States appears to be
cost-sensitive when it comes to peacekeeping, which is in line with existing
qualitative evidence.57
57 Williams 2020.
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figure 5 Accepted and amended tasks, by penholder
Taken together, these patterns suggest several implications for our under-
standing of the relationship between the Security Council and the Secretariat.
First, the fact that the greatest consensus has formed around peacekeeping
tasks suggests that the Council and the Secretariat are most likely to find com-
mon ground around organizational tasks that are well established and uncon-
troversial. By contrast, peacemaking tasks, which present political dilemmas,
are most likely to be a source of divergences. With regard to tasks that might
involve the use of force, such as the protection of civilians and vulnerable
groups, the Secretariat has expressed greater caution than the Council. The
Council’s reluctance to assign peacebuilding tasks without the Secretariat’s
prompting, or the greater likelihood of dropping them, points to its attention to
their resource implications. In turn, the Secretariat’s preference for peacebuild-
ing could stem from its policy or institutional interests, or a combination of the
two. However, while remaining wary of new tasks proposed by the Secretariat,
the Council has been willing to introduce new tasks itself.
This suggests that the Security Council and the Secretariat largely behave
in ways that are expected from intergovernmental bodies and international
bureaucracies: the former is wary of the latter’s expansionary tendencies, but
not necessarily opposed to the growth of IOs’ portfolio of responsibilities if it
can direct the evolution itself. In terms of the peacekeeping literature’s expec-
tations, the Secretariat can be entrepreneurial with regard to certain categories
of tasks (e.g., peacebuilding), but also cautious toward other tasks. The Council
appears to be enthusiastic about tasks that might entail the use of force while
expressing reservations about those with significant cost implications. Finally,
the Council’s suspicion of new tasks when they were proposed by the Secre-
tariat, coupled with the propensity to add new tasks itself, suggests that the
Council has been the main body responsible for the shape of UN peacekeep-
ing in its contemporary form.
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5 Conclusions
UN peacekeeping mandates have grown in complexity since the end of the
Cold War. We have analyzed the views expressed by the two principal UN
organs, the Secretariat and the Security Council, on peacekeeping’s evolution
between 1998 and 2014. The Secretariat, which makes recommendations on
peacekeeping that can be taken up or disregarded by the Council, expressed
preferences over tasks that should be included in peacekeepingmandates that
sometimes differed from those supported by the Council. The Council was par-
ticularly suspicious of peacebuilding tasks and more likely to drop tasks pro-
posed by the Secretariat if they had not appeared in previous mandates. Yet it
added new tasks itself, suggesting it is not invariably opposed to peacekeep-
ing expansion. The Secretariat did not push formandates withmore tasks than
the Council was ready to accept: the number of tasks added and dropped by
the Council was roughly the same. The Secretariat and the Council were least
likely to disagree over peacekeeping tasks. Both of them promoted peacemak-
ing tasks, but of a different nature. The Council was particularly suspicious of
peacebuilding tasks. Among the penholders, the United States was most likely
to drop Secretariat-suggested tasks and least likely to add tasks on its own ini-
tiative.
These findings suggest several implications for the literature on IO evolu-
tion. First,while secretariats areoftenassumed tobe cautious andconservative,
their behavior depends on the nature of innovations. Those that are likely to
lead to organizational success or expansion (or ideally both) often enjoy the
support of IO officials.
Second, member states are eager to steer IO evolution, even if it entails
an expansion of the organization’s task set. With UN peacekeeping opera-
tions, which are temporary organizations, the addition of new tasks poses a
smaller risk of creating lasting institutional effects as compared with expand-
ing responsibilities of the regular Secretariat departments. This gives the Secu-
rity Council more space to experiment with different peacekeeping ap-
proaches. Still, the Council is aware of the cost implications of different types
of peacekeeping activities.
Third, the engagement between intergovernmental bodies and secretariats
dependson themember state that leadsonaparticular portfolio.Duringpeace-
keepingmandate negotiations, smaller powers and collective penholders were
far less likely to modify Secretariat-proposed tasks than the most active pen-
holders, France and the United States. Although the case of UN peacekeeping
is unique in many ways,58 it adds to our knowledge of how different types of
58 The ease with which the Security Council can disregard the Secretariat’s recommenda-
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secretariats and intergovernmental bodies express their preferences over orga-
nizational evolution.
As the first study of systematic patterns in the Secretariat’s and Security
Council’s expressed preferences over peacekeeping, this article opens several
avenues for further research. First, it demonstrates the utility of collecting dis-
aggregated data on peacekeeping mandates, a line of research that has also
resulted in a dataset of peacekeepingmandates, including pre-1998missions.59
Second, our data can be used as a starting point for qualitative analyses of
peacekeeping mandate negotiations examining how a specific round of talks
unfolded, including the positions of the Secretariat and various types of Mem-
ber States, such as the penholder, other Council members, the host govern-
ment, and troop-contributing countries. This would allow assessing the drivers
behind the frequent alignment in expressed preferences between the Secre-
tariat and the Council, which might be the result of policy paradigms of “what
works in peacekeeping” shared by Member States and UN officials.60 Third,
studies should look into how the Secretariat develops its recommendations on
the basis of information from assessment missions, other parts of the UN sys-
tem, and open sources. The Secretariat might pressure predeployment assess-
ment missions to adjust their recommendation not to displease the Council,61
which impedes information collection and analysis. Fourth, while this study
has looked at the peacekeeping mandate design process, researchers should
also assess the dynamics between the Secretariat and the Council at the imple-
mentation, reporting, and performance evaluation stages.62
Finally, our findings suggest two implications for policy. While it is conven-
tional to blame the Secretariat for the expansion of peacekeeping, the Secu-
rity Council should accept responsibility for its role in the process. Shifting
the blame can undermine the Secretariat’s morale, complicate the relation-
ship between the two bodies, and allow governments to evade responsibility
tions stands in contrast to the EU, where the institutions work on a joint text. Member
States’ penholdership also makes the UN different from the African Union (AU), where
the AU Commission has informal drafting responsibilities (Hardt 2016).
59 Di Salvatore et al. 2020.
60 For an application of this concept to UN peacekeeping, see Coleman, Lundgren, and
Oksamytna 2020.
61 Salton 2017.
62 For example, a dataset of activities listed in the Secretary-General’s reports on peace-
keeping operations that followed, rather than preceded, their deployment has been used
to investigate the conditions under which peacekeeping missions implement their man-
dates. Blair, Di Salvatore, and Smidt 2020.
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for the design of interventions. Second, if the high level of agreement between
the Secretariat and the Council is due to UN officials’ inability to be forthcom-
ing, it can prevent the Council from receiving vital information necessary for
crafting effective mandates. The Secretariat has acquired significant expertise
in peacekeeping over the past three decades and has an interest in promot-
ing peace. The Council should make better use of this expertise and commit-
ment.
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Appendix
figure a1 Agreed, dropped, and added tasks across missions
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